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Abstract: This note examines the progress of negotiations
of Passenger Name Record ("PNR") Agreements between the
United States and the European Union following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. First, this note looks
at the need for such information sharing between the U.S.
and the EU and the original PNR Agreement signed in 2004.
It then examines the implications of the European Court of
Justice's annulment of the 2004 agreement, the interim
agreement in 2o06, and the subsequent agreement signed in
2007. In looking at each of these agreements, this note
considers both the compromises that have been made in
constructing these agreements as well as the tensions that
still exist with regard to the international exchange of
personal data. Finally, this note looks at how the Obama
Administration may need to approach continued relations
with the European Union with respect to PNR agreements.
I. 9/11 AND THE NEED FOR EU PNR DATA
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States government realized that there was a clear need for increased
regulation of our nation's aviation system; in particular, there was a
need for increased awareness of who had access to commercial aircraft
and who was booking flights into and within the United States.1 The
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results of subsequent regulations and rules were obvious for travelers:
more thorough inspections at airport security check-points across the
country, increased baggage searches, and tighter restrictions on carry-
on items.2 These regulations changed the nature of air travel in a new,
post-9/ni United States.3 However, with all the obvious changes that
were occurring in the wake of 9/11, there were equally important, but
much less visible, changes occurring in United States law and foreign
policy.
Incorporated into these less visible changes were new early-
detection measures, intended to warn U.S. authorities of potentially
dangerous travelers before they could cause any problems. In 2003,
the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") began screening
domestic air travelers using the Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-
Screening System II program ("CAPPS II").4 The program, which
required passengers to provide personal information (such as full
name, address, phone number, and date of birth) to the airline's
computer reservation system, automatically conducted a full
background check-giving the TSA information about the traveler's
history, including a credit and banking history as well as a full
criminal background check.5 Not surprisingly, privacy groups within
the United States decried CAPPS II as an invasion of privacy, but the
program was defended by the Department of Transportation, which
stated that the program "is being designed with the utmost concern
for the individual privacy rights of American citizens." 6
Since then, the scope of data collection has expanded, and the
United States government has reached out across the Atlantic, to the
European Union, in an effort to create a more comprehensive
I Monte R. Belger, Statement before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, on Security Technology, United
States Senate (Nov. 14, 2001) available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/comsec/resources/senate-biometrics/telll4olst-belger.htm.
2 See, e.g., Transportation Security Administration Prohibited Items,
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-prohibited-items.shtm (last
visited April 8, 2010).
3 Paul Zielbauer & John Sullivan, After the Attacks: Airport Security, FAA Announces
Stricter Rules, Knives No Longer Allowed, N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 2001, at A5.
4 Roy Mark, TSA Books Data Mining Program, INTERNETNEWS.COM, March 4, 2003,
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/2o13781.
5 Id.
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information basis for fighting terrorism in the skies. However, if it
was difficult for the United States to face claims of privacy
infringement solely under U.S. law, the situation that faced the Bush
Administration in the negotiation of PNR Agreements with the EU
was much more complicated. While international cooperation is vital
to successfully combat global terrorist organizations, EU and U.S. law
differ in some significant ways, and formulating an agreement-by
which personal information about private citizens would be shared-
has proved to be no easy task.7
II. ISSUES IN PROVIDING EU PNR DATA TO THE UNITED STATES
A. THE 1995 DIRECTIVE
The central concern within Europe is whether or not the PNR
Agreements with the United States are consistent with EU privacy law.
The most important piece of EU legislation in this area is Directive
95/46/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 ("1995 Directive"). 8
The fundamental objective of this directive is for EU Member
States to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the
processing of personal data."9 To achieve this goal, the 1995 Directive
streamlines the laws of Member States to create an overarching
framework of privacy laws and rights of EU citizens.1°
Especially important to the debate over PNR Agreements is Article
8, which prohibits "the processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning
health or sex life.",, One problem in using PNR data to combat
terrorism-or at least to keep an eye on individuals deemed to have
7 EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), The Balance
Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and its Member
States to the Terrorist Threats, (March 31, 2003), 8 available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.ThemCommentl.pdf.
8 Council and Parliament Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
9 Id., ch. I, art. i(i).
10 Id. at (8).
11 Id. at ch. II, sec. III, art. 8(1).
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some suspicious speck on their records - is that the inclusion of racial
or ethnic characteristics cuts against the prohibitions of Article 8. An
independent committee of experts on fundamental rights in Europe
released an opinion comment about the precarious balance between
freedom and security in post-9/11 Europe, including how agreements
with the United States may affect this balance.12 In their discussion on
the creation of "terrorism profiles," the group states:
The inclusion of elements of identification such as
"nationality," "education" or "family situation" in these
profiles no doubt requires much greater care,
particularly since there is an explicit relationship
between these profiles and the policy on immigration.
At the present stage, the procedures for the
development of these terrorist profiles appear
insufficient in terms of the accuracy and reliability of
information, which is taken into account,
notwithstanding its confidentiality, which cannot
justify a total absence of control.'3
Following 9/11, this provision took on particular relevance with
respect to a general concern of racial or ethnic profiling by
governments in attempts to combat and prevent terrorism.
Even in the most recent manifestation of the PNR Agreements,
concerns about racial and ethnic profiling have not been completely
allayed. The EU is right to worry: after 9/11, organizations such as
the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia noticed
increased hostility towards, and abuse of, European Muslims. 14
Considering this trend in race and ethnic relations in Europe, as well
as the dictates of the 1995 Directive, the European Union faced a
difficult balance of ensuring adequate security and protection against
future attacks, while still maintaining domestic peace and respecting
the rights and privacy protections of individual citizens.
The concern of citizens, however, extends beyond the racism and
xenophobia that emerged after 9/11. There are also questions about
12 EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, supra note 7.
13 Id. at 21.
34 Anya Rudiger, Ph.D., Remarks at the St. Anthony-Princeton Conference - Muslims in
Europe post 9/11 (April 26, 2002) available at
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/princeton/pap-rudiger.shtml.
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what kind of sensitive personal information can be derived from the
information given to airlines. As The Register, a British newspaper,
reported, "[y]our travel records can reveal who you travel with and
how often, how many beds you sleep in (and therefore your sexuality),
who buys your travel tickets, and sometimes even, through the special
meals you order, your medical condition or religion."15 This is a
difficult concern to address: while the EU may not process sensitive
personal information about religion, ethnicity, or sex life, is it also
prohibited from processing data from which this sensitive information
can be derived? This concept continues to be an important element of
the debate over PNR Agreements.
The transmission of PNR data also raises concerns under Article
25 of the 1995 Directive, which states that "[t]he Member States shall
provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer
may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this
Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection."16 The process by which an "adequate level of protection"
is determined is based upon "all the circumstances surrounding a data
transfer operation or set of data transfer operations" and is made in
light of the laws and regulations in place in the third country. 17 It is
only after the European Commission has determined that these
adequate provisions are in place that the EU may engage in
negotiations with countries outside the EU regarding the transfer of
personal data.18 If, however, an adequate level of protection is not
found, then "Member States shall take measures necessary to prevent
any transfer of data for the same type to the third country in
question."19 Thus, if the EU finds that the United States does not have
adequate rules and regulations for the protection of personal data,
then, based upon EU law, negotiations for PNR Agreements will stall
completely because they would be prohibited by the 1995 Directive.
'5 Wendy M. Grossman, The Great Passenger Name Record Sell Out, THE REGISTER,
August 12, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2oo7/o8/12/pnr sell out/print.html.
16 Directive 95/46, supra note 8, ch. IV, art. 25(1).
17Id. at (2).
18 Id. at (5) - (6).
19 id. at (4).
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B. THE ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY
The EU's Article 29 Working Party is central to the debate over
privacy and how privacy can still be protected in an era where national
security relies on the free flow of information between governments.20
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Working Party issued
a series of opinions regarding "the latest state of the dialogue as
regards commitments from the U.S. side on the conditions for
processing of passenger PNR data by U.S. authorities."21 In these
opinions, the Working Party stated that while the exchange of PNR
data is an important component in the global war on terrorism, safety
from terrorism cannot be gained at the expense of personal liberties
and privacy rights of individuals.22 Citing a list of EU conventions,
such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Working Party
argued that instead of racing headlong into PNR Agreements,
"limitations on the fundamental rights and freedoms regarding the
data protection principles governing the processing of personal data
in the European Union should only take place if necessary in a
democratic society for the protection of public interest."23
Consistently, the Working Party has been a voice of caution in
negotiations over PNR Agreements. Specifically, it expressed concern
over the lack of specificity in provisions of early PNR Agreements,2 4
and consistently worked to ensure that the immediacy of the terrorism
threat did not cause individual privacy rights to be forgotten in
negotiations.
20 Established in the 95 Directive, the Working Party is comprised of "a representative of
the supervisory authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a
representative of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions
and bodies, and of a representative of the Commission." The responsibilities of the
Working Party include examining national measures adopted under the Directive to ensure
uniformity of the laws of the Member States, and issuing opinions regarding the level of
adequate protection of other EU legislation which would affect the rights of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal information. Id. at Art. 29(2), Art. 30(1).
21 Opinion 2/2004 on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Contained in the PNR of
Air Passengers to be Transferred to the United States' Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (US CBP), 10019/04/EN, WP 87, 29 January 2004, at 2.
22 Id. at3.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., id. at 6 (vagueness of phrase -other serious crimes").
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III. AGREEMENTS AND CONTROVERSY
A. THE 2004 AGREEMENT
In May 2004, the United States Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") and the European Union signed an international agreement
("2004 Agreement") which required "air carriers to provide U.S.
Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") with access to passenger
name records for purposes of screening individuals travelling to and
from the United States."25 Under the 2004 Agreement, this data was
to be exchanged to "the extent it [was] collected and retained in the air
carrier's automated reservation/departure control systems"26 and
would be used to screen individuals before their departure to or from
the United States.27 In the context of the 2004 Agreement, PNR data
is defined as "a record of each passenger's travel requirements which
contains all information necessary to enable reservations be processed
and controlled by the booking and participating airlines."28
Under the 2004 Agreement, thirty-four data elements were
requested by CBP from air carriers.29 However, while the amount of
25 Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security, A Report Concerning Passenger Name
Record Information Derived from Flights Between the U.S. and European Union, 18
December 2oo8, at 6-7.
26 European Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the
Court (Grand Chamber), 30 May 2006, at 26 (citing Undertakings of the Department of
Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), annexed to Commission
Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11).
27 Privacy Office, supra note 25, at 7.
28 Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11, at (4).
Under the Agreement, a "booking airline" is "an airline with which the passenger made his
original reservations or with which additional reservations were made after the
commitment of the journey." A "participating airline" means "any airline on which the
booking airline has requested space, on one or more of its flights, to be held for a
passenger.-
29 These data elements include: PNR record locator code, date of reservation, date(s) of
intended travel, name, other names on PNR, address, all forms of payment information,
billing address, contact phone numbers, all travel itinerary for specific PNR, frequent flyer
information (limited to miles flown and address(es)), travel agency, travel agent, code
share PNR information, travel status of passenger, split/divided PNR information, email
address, ticketing field information, general remarks, ticket number, seat number, date of
ticket issuance, no show history, bag tag numbers, go show information, OSI information,
SSI/SSR information, received from information, all changes to the PNR, number of
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data provided by the airlines to CBP was extensive, the use of PNR
data by the United States was expressly limited in the 2004
Agreement. As the European Commission noted in its examination of
the privacy protections in place under the 2004 Agreement, PNR data
are used by CBP strictly for purpose of preventing and combating: 1.
terrorism and related crimes; 2. flight from warrants or custody for
the crimes above. Use of PNR data for these purposes permitted CBP
to focus its resources on high-risk concerns, thereby facilitating and
safeguarding bona fide travel."3o The 2004 Agreement included
numerous other restrictions on the transfer of PNR data between CBP
and other United States government agencies. In particular, the 2004
Agreement stated that "CBP will judiciously exercise its discretion to
transfer PNR data for the stated purposes."31
In exercising this discretion, CBP was required to first determine if
the use for which transfer was required would be consistent with the
stated purposes of the 2004 Agreement. If so, then CBP would
determine whether the party to which the information would be
transferred had a valid reason for pursuing enforcement of the
purposes of the PNR-that is, whether the party is "responsible for
preventing, investigating, or prosecuting the violations of, or enforcing
or implementing, a statute or regulation related to that purpose."32
Another important aspect of the 2004 Agreement was that it
provided rules about the storage of PNR data. Under the 2004
Agreement, CBP would permit access to PNR data for seven days,
after which time, access to such data would be placed on a more
restricted status for three and a half years.33 After that time, any data
that had not been accessed during the three and a half year period
would be destroyed, while that which had been accessed would be
transferred to a "deleted record file" to be held for eight years before
destruction.34 The length of time that the United States would retain
travelers on the PNR, seat information, one-way tickets, any collected APIS (Advanced
Passenger Information System) information, and ATFQ (Automatic Ticketing Fare Quote)
fields. Andreas Busch, From Safe Harbrour to the Rough Sea? Privacy Disputes Across
the Atlantic, 3 SCRIPT-ED 304, 312 (June 20o6).
30 Commission Decision 2004/535, Annex, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11, 15.
31 See European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, supra note 26, at 26.
32 Id.
33 Commission Decision 2004/535, Annex, 2004 0.J. (L 235) 11, 17.
34 Id.
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PNR data later proved to be an important part of re-negotiation
discussions, as Europeans were skeptical about the need for U.S.
officials to keep unused (or little used) PNR data for such a long time.
B. 2004 ADEQUACY DETERMINATION
An important prerequisite for any PNR Agreement between the
United States and EU is a determination by the European Union that
the U.S. agencies receiving PNR data maintain adequate levels of
protection over this information. This requirement is set out in
Article 25 of the 1995 Directive and, in May 2004, The Commission of
the European Communities announced its finding of adequacy with
respect to the U.S. CBP.35
There are several points that seem to be central to the
Commission's decision to permit PNR data transfers to the United
States-and which also serve as the foundation of later disputes over
the legality of subsequent PNR Agreements. First, because of the
personal, and potentially sensitive, nature of the data subject to
transfer, it was important that there be only one recipient of the
information (to control the data as much as possible to prevent
unnecessary dissemination). In this case, "the data transfers
concerned involve specific controllers, namely airlines operating
flights between the Community and the United States, and only one
recipient in the United States, namely the CBP."36 Limited transfer
among U.S. government agencies was contemplated by the
Commission, however, the legality of these transfers required that the
U.S. have good reason to transfer PNR data outside CBP before such a
transfer could be completed.37 An important exception to the
permissible transfer provisions is any public disclosures under the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA)-in fact, the Commission
explicitly stated that "no other foreign, federal, State or local agency
has direct electronic access to PNR data through CBP databases. CBP
will refuse public disclosure of PNR, by virtue of exemptions from the
relevant provisions of FOIA."38 Thus, tight control and limited access
35 See id.
36d. at (9).
37 Id. at (11)-(13). The Commission cited Department of Homeland Security regulations
and rules that would set forth the parameters of transfers within the U.S. government. See
Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border
Patrol of 11 May 2004.
38 Id. at (20).
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to PNR data by agencies or persons outside the CBP formed a crucial
element to the Adequacy Decision of 2004.
Other important elements were transparency and the rights of
access and ratification by the data subject.39 The Adequacy Decision
states that "the data subject may request a copy of PNR data and
rectification of inaccurate data."4o The foundation of the right to
access and ratification stems from the 1995 Directive, which contains
several sections relating to the data subject's right to access and
challenge of that data.41 Subject to certain limited exceptions, data
subjects must receive notice about the identity of the data controller,
purposes for processing the data, and any further information,
including any recipients of the data and any rights to correction of
inaccurate data.42
Thus, even while the Commission of the European Communities
did find that the United States maintains an adequate level of
protection for PNR data - and therefore that PNR Agreements are
permissible under EU law - the terms and requirements of the
handling of this data are important and would set the stage for later
disputes over provisions of PNR Agreements.
C. 2006 EU PARLIAMENT CHALLENGE AS TO
LEGAL BASIS OF THE 2004 AGREEMENT
The most significant challenge to PNR Agreements came in the
form of a 2006 lawsuit, brought by the European Parliament to annul
both the 2004 PNR Agreement between the EU and United States,
and the Commission of the European Communities' Adequacy
Decision.43 In seeking to annul the Adequacy Decision, the European
Parliament advanced "pleas for annulment, alleging, respectively,
ultra vires action, breach of the fundamental principles of the [1995]
39 Id. at (17)-(19).
40 Id. at (19).
41 See generally Council and Parliament Directive 95/46, supra note 8, at sections IV -
VII.
42 See, e.g., id. at section IV, art. lo.
43 See European Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 26,
at (1).
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Directive, breach of fundamental rights and breach of the principle of
proportionality."44
The Parliament argued that the adequacy decision was
inappropriate because elements of the 1995 Directive were not
complied with-particularly Article 3(2) of that Directive. Article 3(2)
stipulates that an exception exists with respect to the general
prohibition on the electronic processing of personal data if the data is
processed "in the course of an activity that falls outside the scope of
Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the
Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations
concerning public security, defense, State security . . and the
activities of the State in areas of criminal law."45
The Parliament argued that the activities required under the 2004
Agreement are within the scope of Community law.46 On the other
hand, the Commission (which promulgated the Decision of Adequacy)
disagreed, and drew a distinction between the private airline carriers
collecting the information, and public authorities acting outside the
scope of Community law. The key to this argument was that "Article
3(2) of the Directive refers to the activities of public authorities which
fall outside the scope of Community law," while the Decision of
Adequacy contemplated the transmission of PNR data by private
airline carriers, which fall within the scope of Community law.47
Parliament's argument to annul the 2004 Agreement was based on
two primary arguments: "the incorrect choice of Article 95 EC as the
legal basis for the [2004 Agreement]" and the breach of "Article 8 of
the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights], the
principle of proportionality, the requirement to state reasons and the
principle of cooperation in good faith."48
With respect to the incorrect legal basis for the 2004 Agreement,
the Parliament argued that the 1995 Directive was improper because
the decision "does not have as its objective and subject-matter the
establishment and functioning of the internal market by contributing
to the removal of obstacles to the freedom to provide services and it
44 Id. at (50).
45 See Council and Parliament Directive 95/46, supra note 8, art. 3(2).
46 See European Parliament v. commission on the European Communities, supra note 26,
at (53).
47 Id. at (53) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at (62).
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does not contain provisions designed to achieve such an objective."49
Essentially, the Parliament argued that, because the exchange of PNR
data is a matter of law enforcement and internal security, the power to
make this kind of agreement does not rest with the centralized
European Union in Brussels, but rather, with the individual European
states.50
The European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") provided
another important basis for the Parliament's arguments against the
2004 Agreement. Article 8 provides: "(1) Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence; (2) There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."51
Specifically, the Parliament argued that the 2004 Agreement and
the Adequacy Decision violated provisions of necessity and
proportionality contained within the ECHR.52 Data retention by the
government, in particular, came under fire as a violation of Article 8.
As Privacy International, an organization devoted to the protection of
personal privacy, noted: "The indiscriminate collection of traffic data
49 Id. at (62-63).
50 Stewart A. Baker & Nathan Alexander Sales, Homeland Security, Information Policy, and
the Transatlantic Alliance (March 17, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 09-20, 11, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361943. The court
notes that while the EU adopted the 2004 Agreement under its "First Pillar" powers of
trade, travel, and other economic issues relating to the common European market, in fact,
the agreement was not designed for economic purposes. Rather, its focus is security and
law-enforcement. Therefore, the EU lacked authority to enter the agreement, because law-
enforcement is not one of the powers given to the EU under European law. See id. at 11.
See also Henriette Tielemans, et. al. The Transfer of Airline Passenger Data to the U.S.:
An Analysis of the ECJ Decision, BNA International World Data Protection Report (June
2oo6), at 4, available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/8aa81e95-46oa-4d3o-
a9ol-28b14757ecoo/Presentation/PubliationAttachment/37fnlb14-ff49-4e95-a5ce-
2eeo16f94329/oid23778.pdf (noting that with respect to "third pillar" law enforcement
power, the Parliament's role is limited to non-binding resolutions and Member States often
must unanimously consent to text of any resolution).
5' European Convention on Human Rights, November 4, 195o, Art. 8 available at
http://www.hri.org/does/ECHR5o.html.
52 Tielemans, et. al. supra note 50, at 4.
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offends a core principle of the rule of law: that citizens should have
notice of the circumstances in which the State may conduct
surveillance, so that they can regulate their behavior to avoid
unwanted intrusions."53 Concurrent with this requirement is the law
that any interference into the private lives of individuals cannot be
disproportionate, and any interference that is disproportionate is
invalid because it "cannot be said to be necessary in a democratic
society."54 Thus, Parliament argued that, considering the rule of
proportionality, the data processing and retention authorized by the
2004 Agreement is in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.
D. 2006 EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION
In May 2006, the Court of Justice of the European Communities
("ECJ") handed down an opinion that annulled both the 2004
Agreement and the Adequacy Decision on which it was premised.55
Although the court decision was significant because it opened the door
for future negotiations on the exchange of information between the
U.S. and EU, the court's decision was less relevant to privacy law than
it might seem at first glance; rather than focusing on the privacy
concerns raised by Parliament, the decision was based on
jurisdictional issues.
The case was in fact two separate cases that had been consolidated
by the court for consideration. In the first part of the consolidated
case, the court considered the legality of the Decision of Adequacy. In
finding that the Decision was invalid, the court focused on the fact
that the Decision violated Article 3(2) of the 1995 Directive. Article
3(2) is significant because it excludes from the Directive's scope "the
processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls
outside the scope of Community law,.., and in any case processing
operations concerning public security, defense, State security and the
activates of the State in areas of criminal law."56 The purpose of PNR
53 Privacy International, Memorandum of Laws Concerning the Legality of Data Retention
with Regard to the Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights,
October 10, 2003, 3, available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/uk/surveillance/pi-data-retention-mem
o.pdf.
54 Id.
5 See European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, supra note 26, at (61) and
(70).
56 Id. at (54).
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data transfers to CBP is defined under U.S. law as "preventing and
combating terrorism and related crimes, other serious crimes,
including organized [sic] crime, that are transnational in nature, and
flight from warrants or custody for those crimes."57 Because of the law
enforcement nature of the PNR transfers, the court concluded that
"the transfer of PNR data to CBP constitutes processing operations
concerning public security and the activities of the State in areas of
criminal law."s8
The court disagreed with the Commission's argument that,
because the PNR data is collected by private operators for commercial
purposes, it is not covered by Article 3(2) of the Directive. Instead,
the court held that the transfer of this kind of data, in the manner
contemplated when the Decision of Adequacy was made, does relate
to public security and is thus outside the scope of Community law and
subject to Article 3(2) of the Directive. The court then concluded that
"the decision of adequacy must consequently be annulled."59
In annulling the 2004 Agreement, the court relied on its holding
on the issue of the Decision of Adequacy finding that, because the
2004 Agreement "relates to the same transfer of data as the decision
on adequacy and therefore to data processing operations" that are
beyond the EU's authority under the Directive, the 2004 Agreement
must also be annulled. 6°
E. INTERIM AGREEMENT
Apart from nullifying both the 2004 Agreement and the Decision
of Adequacy on which it was based, the ECJ decision was also
significant because it preserved the applicability of the Decision of
Adequacy until September 30, 2006.61 In deciding to extend the life of
the Decision of Adequacy (and thereby allow for the continuance of
the 2004 Agreement, or other manifestations of PNR Agreements),
the court cited a need for "legal certainty and in order to protect
persons concerned"-presumably to protect European citizens from
whatever might happen if, after the ECJ decision, CBP was relieved of
57 Id. at (55).
58 Id. at (56).
59 Id. at (58)-(61).
60 Id. at (68).
61 Id. at (73)-(74).
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all obligations for the protection of PNR data already in the U.S.'s
possession. 62
In October 2006, the United States and European Union reached
an Interim Agreement which would expire once a new, permanent
agreement was reached (but no later than July 31, 2007).63
The content of the Interim Agreement was largely similar to the
2004 Agreement: the U.S. would "continue to process PNR data
received and treat data subjects concerned by such processing in
accordance with undertakings given in 2004."64 The transfer of PNR
data also remained the same as under the 2004 Agreement and the
EU retained responsibility for ensuring that "air carriers operating
passenger flights in foreign air transportation to or from the U.S.
process PNR data contained in their automated reservation systems as
required by the U.S. administration. '" 65
There are several significant ways in which the Interim Agreement
differed from the 2004 Agreement. First, the Agreement stated that
the U.S. will not "pull" information from airline databases, but rather,
the information will be "pushed."66 This provision was arguably a
victory for the European Union-the Article 29 Working Party had
previously stated, in a 2004 report, that the push method of data
transfer was superior to the previously used pull method.67 As the
Article 29 Working Party wrote: "It is a matter of general data
protection principle that recipients should only be given data they
actually need. In the 'pull' method.., recipients are given all data. It
is then their duty to filter out and use only the data for which they
62 Id. at (73).
63 Agreement on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air
Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, U.S.-EU, Oct. 19, 20o6,
2006 O.J. (L 298) 29, 30.
64 Council of the European Union, Council Adopts Decision On Signature ofAgreement
with the United States On the Continued Use of PNR Data, EGOVMONITOR, October 17,
2o06, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/816
65 Id.
66 New EU-US Interim Deal on Passenger Name Record, EDRI-GRAM, Number 4.19,
October 11, 2oo6, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.19/pnr.
67 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, "Push-Pull Factsheet," March 21, 2007,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004-20o9/documents/dv/pull-
push factsheet /pull-push factsheeten.pdf, 2.
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have authorisation [sic] under an agreement."68 In contrast, under
the push system, the airlines would be responsible for giving CBP the
data covered by the Agreement. 69 This was significant because it did
not require the EU to relinquish control of any data not covered by the
Agreement.
Additionally, the Interim Agreement contained some negotiated
victories for the U.S., including more allowances for transfers of PNR
data between U.S. government agencies. Under the new agreement,
"PNR data will be available also to several US counter-terrorism
agencies, if they have comparable standards of data protection with
the EU."7° This expansion of data sharing within the U.S. was a
departure from the 2004 Agreement and the subject of debate as the
EU resisted any potentially risky or unnecessary dissemination of
personal data.
F. NEGOTIATING THE 2007 AGREEMENT
As negotiations for the 2007 Agreement proceeded during the
spring and early summer of 2007, two opponents to the proposed
Agreements emerged and voiced strong opinions about privacy issues.
In February 2007, the Article 29 Working Party issued an opinion
on the transfer of PNR data to U.S. authorities,71 which focused on
providing notice to passengers that data about them was being
recorded, transferred, processed, and stored. As the Working Party
noted, "according to the Directive, the obligation to inform data
subjects is placed on the data controller."72 Because in the end both
the EU and U.S. would control personal information, it was necessary,
in the view of the Working Party, for the Agreement to articulate a
notification system by which data subjects would be alerted to the fact
that their information was being collected, stored, and transferred.
The Working Party believed that the airlines, their travel agents, or
reservation systems should be the mechanism by which individuals
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 New EU-US Interim Deal on Passenger Name Record, supra note 66.
71 Opinion 2/2007 on Information to Passengers About Transfer of PNR Data to US
Authorities, XXXX/o7/EN, WP 132, 15 February 2007.
72 Id. at4.
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are notified.73 The principle behind this notice requirement was a
"guarantee of fair processing in respect of the data subject," and was
established by Articles 10 and 11 of the 1995 Directive, meaning that it
carried significant weight for consideration.74
The European Parliament also lodged its own concerns about the
proposed 2007 Agreement. In a resolution adopted in July 2007, the
Parliament criticized the proposal as failing to meet its second
objective of helping prevent and combat terrorism and international
crime.75 Parliament contended that the reason this objective could not
be met with the proposal under consideration was that the proposal
was "substantively flawed in terms of legal certainty, data protection
and legal redress for EU citizens, in particular as a result of open and
vague definitions and multiple possibilities for exceptions."76 Instead,
Parliament stated that "adequate protection of private and civil
liberties of individual citizens and data quality controls are necessary
if the sharing of data and information is to be a valuable and reliable
tool in the fight against terrorism."77 The language and tone of this
resolution is important to recognize-Parliament was in agreement
that information sharing is an integral part to the war against
terrorism and international crime, however, it also recognized that it
is simultaneously important to establish these channels of information
sharing in ways that are protective of privacy rights.
The media also intervened in the discussion by publishing
numerous stories on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean about the
negotiations and upcoming PNR Agreement. On the British side of
the discussion, the media was consistently concerned with what it saw
as a "complete handover of the rights of people travelling to the
United States."78 As many news outlets saw it, the problem was not
only that PNR data would be exchanged for the purpose of combating
73 Id. at2.
74 Id. at5.
75 European Parliament Resolution of July 12, 2007 on the PNR Agreement with the United
States of America, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/ul/ep-pnr-resolution-jul-
07.pdf.
76 Id. at (C).
77 Id. at (E).
78 David Millward, US 'License to Snoop' on British Air Travellers, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,
January 2, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1538286/US-
licence-to-snoop-on-British-air-travellers.html.
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terrorism, but that the same information could be used when dealing
with other serious (although, as of yet, not well defined) crimes.79
This fear that personal information would be used inappropriately was
at the forefront of European minds in the months leading up to a new
PNR Agreement.
Another concern articulated by the British media was that of
reciprocity of information exchanges. As The Telegraph (a British
newspaper) stated, "Washington promised to 'encourage' U.S. airlines
to make similar information available to EU governments-rather
than compel them to do so."80 The potential one-sided nature of
future PNR Agreements was concerning for Europeans who would
have rather seen a more quid pro quo approach to information
sharing.
On the American side, the media's reaction to ongoing
negotiations was less concerned and more conciliatory-noting
various opportunities for compromise on PNR data exchanges. One
article, quoting then-chief privacy officer of the DHS, Hugo Teufel, III,
was optimistic that "there will very likely be increased privacy
protections with respect to PNR data" in future Agreements, including
"a decrease, perhaps even a significant decrease, in the amount of
time [the passenger data] is retained."8'
Thus, in the days and months leading up to the expiration of the
Interim Agreement, it was clear that both sides had unrelenting
concerns over privacy and security that would need to be addressed
before a successful PNR Agreement could be reached.
G. 2007 AGREEMENT
In late July 2007, U.S. and European Union signed the 2007 PNR
Agreement ("2007 Agreement"); this Agreement continued the
mission of preventing and combating terrorism and transnational
crime through mutual sharing of information and transfer of PNR
data by air carriers to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 82
79 Id.
8o Id.
81 James Niccolai, Compromise Possible in U.S.-E.U. Passenger Data Dispute, CIO.COM,
June 14, 2007, available at http://www.cio.com/article/print/195oo
82 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/pnr-2007agreement-usversion.pdf. In 2003, CBP
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Coming on the heels of the Interim Agreement, one of the
significant provisions of the 2007 Agreement was that it provided for
DHS to "immediately transition to a push system for the transmission
of data by such air carriers no later than January 1, 2008 for all such
air carriers that have implemented such a system that complies with
DHS's technical requirements." 83
The 2007 Agreement also includes a provision for the periodical
review of the implementation of the Agreement, both by the U.S. and
the EU to ensure "the effective operation and privacy protection of
their systems."84 However, this emphasis on cooperation is limited,
and it is relatively unclear from the terms of the Agreement exactly
how stringent privacy measures must be-especially those taken by
the United States. The 2007 Agreement does state that "DHS shall
process PNR data received and treat data subjects concerned by such
processing in accordance with applicable U.S. laws, constitutional
requirements, and without unlawful discrimination, in particular on
the basis of nationality and country of residence."85 However, to the
extent that these standards are different from standards within the
EU, it is unclear whether the concerns voiced by the Article 29
Working Party, European Parliament, or the EU media have really
been fully alleviated.
The significant and more detailed portion of the 2007 Agreement
is not contained within the signed Agreement itself, but consists of
two letters exchanged between Michael Chertoff, the U.S. Secretary of
Homeland Security and Luis Amado, the President of the Council of
the European Union.8 6 The first letter articulates "the policies which
DHS applies to PNR data derived from flights between the U.S. and
European Union (EU PNR) under U.S. law."8 7
was moved from the Department of the Treasury to the newly-created Department of
Homeland Security, as such, the 2007 PNR Agreement was negotiated to allow transfer of
data from the EU to DHS, rather than only to CBP. See generally The U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Security, "History: Who Became Part of the Department?"
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial-o133.shtm (last visited April 8, 2010).
83 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 82, at 4.
84 Id. at5.
85 Id.
86 Agreement on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air
Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR
Agreement), U.S.-EU, Aug. 4, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 18.
87 Id.
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Significantly, the data requested by the United States under the
2007 Agreement was limited to only nineteen pieces of data.88
Additionally, because the transfer and processing of sensitive personal
data (such as that related to racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or
sexual orientation) was such a contentious issue, the handling of this
information is addressed directly in the 2007 Agreement. As stated in
the U.S. letter to the EU, to the extent that this kind of sensitive
information reaches the U.S. through the transfer process, "DHS
employs an automated system which filters those sensitive PNR codes
and terms and does not use this information," and it is then deleted
from the U.S. system.89
The United States also addressed Europe's concerns about access
and redress. In its letter accompanying the 2007 Agreement, the DHS
explicitly stated that it "maintains a system accessible by individuals,
regardless of their nationality or country of residence, for providing
redress to persons seeking information about or correction of PNR."9o
The U.S. also extended the protections of the U.S. Privacy Act and U.S.
Freedom of Information Act over PNR data and subjects.91 This
means that although the U.S. does have some room for the public
release of PNR information, it can only do so to the extent that such
release is not prohibited by the Privacy Act. FOIA also provides
88 Id. at 21-22. The newly requested pieces of information are: PNR record locator code;
date of reservation/issue of ticket; date(s) of intended travel; name(s); available frequent
flier and benefit information (i.e., free tickets, upgrades, etc.); other names on PNR,
including number of travelers on PNR; all available contact information (including
originator information); all available payment/billing information (not including other
transaction details linked to a credit card or account and not connected to the travel
transaction); travel itinerary for specific PNR; travel agency/travel agent; code share
information; split/divided information; travel status of passenger (including confirmations
and check-in status); ticketing information, including ticket number, one-way tickets and
Automated Ticket Fare Quote; all baggage information; seat information, including seat
number; general remarks including OSI, SSI and SSR information; any collected APIs
information; all historical changes to the PNR listed in numbers 1-18.
89 Id. There are several narrow exceptions where sensitive data is not deleted by the U.S.
once it has been identified. These include situations where "the life of a data subject or of
others could be imperiled or seriously impaired." In these situations, DHS may retain
sensitive data for up to 3o days, but will provide notice to the European Commission about
such situations. Id.
go Id. at 23.
91Id.
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another avenue by which PNR subjects may access their PNR data to
check for accuracy.92
However, perhaps most significantly, not only were measures for
access and redress included in the 2007 Agreement, but so were
means for enforcement of these provisions. Under the new
agreement, "[a]dministrative, civil, and criminal enforcement
measures are available under U.S. law for violations of U.S. privacy
rules and unauthorized disclosure of U.S. records."93 So, the 2007
Agreement not only resolved concerns about privacy, security, access,
and correction, but it also addressed the issue of enforcement.
Another contentious issue that arose under the 2004 Agreement
was the length of time the U.S. would retain PNR data once it had
been received. The 2007 Agreement stipulates that EU PNR data will
remain in "active analytical database" for seven years, at which time it
will be moved to "dormant, non-operational status," where it remains
for an additional eight years.94 This is a longer time than was
provided for under the 2004 Agreement; however, concerns about the
longer holding period may have been allayed in Europe by the
increased opportunities for access and correction of PNR data.
H. EU REACTION TO 2007 AGREEMENT
Despite reports and discussions over privacy concerns in the
months leading up to the 2007 Agreement, the European media's
reaction to the 2007 Agreement was one of suspicion, mistrust, and
general concern. The Register called the 2007 Agreement "The Great
Passenger Name Record Sell Out" and claimed that, despite
assurances to the contrary, sensitive data was not adequately
protected under the Agreement and that passenger access provisions
were not being thoroughly enforced.95
Another issue was the reduction of data fields requested-from
thirty-five to nineteen. While at first glance this appeared to be a
victory for Europeans - limiting the amount of data transferred to the
United States - critics in Europe argued the opposite. As one
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Wendy M. Grossman, The Great Passenger Name Record Sell Out, THE REGISTER, Aug.
12, 2007, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2oo7/o8/12/pnr sell out/print.html.
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commentator argued: "what the Americans and Europeans cunningly
did is dupe the entire population by taking the list of 34, dropping
two, and then taking less lines on the page. They merged items on one
line."96
The provision outlining the acceptable uses of PNR data was
criticized in Europe as being too vague. As one member of European
Parliament stated in June 2007: "The PNR deal is simply bad. The
purposes for which the personal data can be used are not sufficiently
defined. Furthermore, data are being used not only for investigations
but also for profiling and data mining (automated computer system)
that makes profiles of individuals based on collected data."97
But the 2007 Agreement did not just spark a reaction in Europe-
American media outlets also picked up on anxieties over the new PNR
data exchange arrangement. Under the 2007 Agreement, if and when
Europe ever implemented a PNR data processing system, the United
States would be required to reciprocate arrangements made under the
2007 Agreement and provide the EU with data about American
citizens traveling abroad.98 In November 2007, The Washington Post
carried an article about the implementation of this reciprocity
provision, stating that, for the first time, American travelers' personal
data would be exported to all EU states by airline carriers flying to
Europe.99 Criticisms of the proposal came from both sides of the
Atlantic, primarily from civil libertarians and liberal politicians (who
also generally opposed the 2007 Agreement). These critics expressed
concern that there was still insufficient "evidence of how effective the
use of these data are in the fight against terrorists."1oo
Of particular concerns for Americans was the possibility of the EU
using algorithms on PNR data to create risk assessments. As James
Harrison, an attorney with the Identity Project, noted: "Congress
forbids the U.S. from conducting algorithms on passenger data
96 Id.
97 EU-US Data-Sharing Deals Renew Privacy Concerns," EuRAcriv.cOM. June 29, 2007,
available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-us-data-sharing-deals-renew-
privacy-concerns/article-165077 (comments by MEP Sophie in't Veld, D66 Netherlands).
98 2007 Agreement, supra note 82, at 5.
99 Ellen Nakashima, E. U. Seeks Data on American Passengers, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Nov. 4, 2007, A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2oo7/11/o3/AR2oo711o3oo956.html.
1oo Id.
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domestically ... That is exactly what they are talking about [in the
proposed reciprocity plan]."lol Thus, even while the 2007 Agreement
did allay some European concerns-primarily by extending Privacy
Act protections to non-U.S. citizens-concerns about the use of PNR
data continue in both Europe and the United States.102
I. AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM'S SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICE
In August 2007, soon after the conclusion of the 2007 Agreement,
the Department of Homeland Security released a System of Records
Notice ("SORN") for the new Automated Targeting System ("ATS"),
used to implement the 2007 Agreement and screen PNR data received
from Europe pursuant to that agreement. 0 3 As a screening tool, "ATS
allows DHS officers charged with enforcing U.S. law and preventing
terrorism and other crimes to effectively and efficiently manage
information collected when travelers or goods seek to enter, exit, or
transit through the United States."1°4 ATS is the system in which CBP
maintains information about travelers entering the United States; this
system allows CBP "to determine whether a variety of potential risk
indicators exist for travelers and/or their itineraries that may warrant
additional scrutiny."'' 5 Thus, ATS provides the mechanism by which
the PNR data is analyzed and stored by DHS and CBP. It is ATS, then,
that is the subject of data request by both U.S. and European Citizens
wishing to access and correct PNR data. The SORN notes that ATS is
subject to the legal requirements of the Privacy Act and, as such,
"[n]otwithstanding the listed exemptions for the system, individuals,
regardless of their citizenship, may make a written request to review
and access personal data.., that is collected by CBP and contained in
the PNR database stored in the ATS."106 The ATS SORN, then, is
another explanatory document; it alerts EU and U.S. citizens to rights
10, Id. Identity Project is a privacy organization that focuses on the First Amendment
implications of domestic data processing. See http://www.papersplease.org/who.html.
102 Id.
103 Automated Targeting System (ATS) System of Records Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 43, 650
(Aug. 6, 2007).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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under the 2007 Agreement and further describes the processes and
procedures for handling of PNR data.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: REMAINING ISSUES IN PNR
AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2008 REPORT
In December 2008, pursuant to a provision in the 2007
Agreement requiring periodical review of the implementation of PNR
data exchanges, the U.S. DHS Privacy Office released "A Report
Concerning Passenger Name Record Information Derived from
Flights Between the U.S. and the European Union" ("2008
Report").107 This report analyzed U.S. compliance with both the 2007
Agreement as well as the ATS SORN-noting those areas where the
DHS and CBP were in compliance with the mandates of those
documents and areas where improvements could be made.
Of particular importance were those areas where the Privacy
Office found room for improvement-areas where DHS and CBP could
bring themselves more in line with the requirements of the 2007
Agreement and ATS SORN. First, the 2008 Report noted that "if an
individual requests 'all information held by CBP' the FOIA specialist
generally does not search ATS because PNR was not specifically
requested. ' o8 This is noteworthy because it suggests inadequate
compliance with provisions of access and redress in the 2007
Agreement. Second, the 2o08 Report notes that Privacy Act and FOIA
personnel need to ensure that "where a PNR is indexed and retrieved
by the requester's name or personal identifier and the information
contains information pertaining to a third person whose information
does not directly pertain to the individual requesting the information,
the requestor only receives personally identifiable information about
themselves."109 To release a third party's information to the requestor
107 Privacy Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, A Report Concerning Passenger
name Record Information Derived from Flights Between the U.S. and the European
Union, Dec. 18, 2008. (2008 Report), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pnr-reporto20081218.pdf.
lo Id. at 26.
log Id.
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would be counter to the ATS SORN policy and provisions of the
Privacy Act. °10
In light of these two realizations about the handling of PNR data,
the 2008 Report suggests that, with improved training of FOIA
personnel, improvements can be made which will "improve response
time, improve the quality of responses and the redaction, and the
sufficiency of searches."111
However, even though the Privacy Office concluded that DHS and
CBP are in compliance with the mandates of the ATS SORN and the
2007 Agreement, following the release of the 2008 Report, there was
a flurry of media attention thrown on the issue-much of it critical of
DHS handling of PNR data.
Of particular concern was the length of time it took DHS to answer
requests for PNR data-typically more than one year and occasionally
"many times longer than the legal time limits in the Privacy Act and
Freedom of Information Act."112 This is significant because, if requests
are exceeding the time allowed under U.S. law, then not only are the
rights of European citizens being violated, but also those of U.S.
citizens."3
In response to criticisms of following the release of the 2008
Report, Hugo Teufel, Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of
Homeland Security, released a statement emphasizing the legality of
DHS and CBP under the 2007 Agreement and continued compliance
with all federal and international obligations."4 As to
recommendations for improvement made in the 2008 Report, Teufel
stated:
[F]or every recommendation made in the report, there
was a concrete and actionable response that CBP began
to implement before the report was even issued. As
110 Id
IlI Id.
112 DHS Admits Problems in Disclosing Travel Surveillance Records, PAPERS, PLEASE!,
http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2oo8/12/24/dhs-admits-problems-in-disclosing-travel-
surveillance-records/ (Dec. 24, 2008, io:o8 EST).
113 Id
.
114 Posting of DHS, What the Passenger Name Record Report Really Says, LEADERSHIP
JOURNAL ARCHIVE, http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/20o8/12/what-passenger-
name-record-report.html (Dec. 31, 2008, 15:o9 EST).
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with any program, improvements can always be made
and so is the case here. CBP did not fail in meeting its
commitments to the [2007] Agreement and Letters
between DHS and the Council of the European Union.
CBP actively contributed to the review, opening itself
up to criticism while still trying to operationally meet
the requirements of the 2007 Agreement and Letters.ix5
This statement is important because it emphasizes a continued need
for improvement in how requests for PNR data are handled, while still
acknowledging and reassuring citizens that proper privacy
considerations and obligations are being met.
V. CONCLUSION
The questions that remain about the future of PNR Agreements
between the U.S. and EU depend largely on the attitude of President
Obama and the degree to which his attitude towards these agreements
differs from that of his predecessor, President George W. Bush. While
Europe generally views the new president's stance on foreign policy
positively-especially his inauguration promises to end the "War on
Terror" and restore compliance with international humanitarian
law"x6-Europeans are not overly optimistic with regard to changes in
the handling of PNR data."7 In particular, one news source notes that
although some sections of the U.S. government have shown renewed
commitment to international agreements, "there has been no major
initiative yet" from the Department of Homeland Security to "soften
up on requirements," even though Secretary Janet Napolitano has
shown a "difference of style" from the Bush Administration. 1 8
If, even in the face of continued terrorist threats and plots around
the world, the United States can show a renewed commitment to
115 Id.
116 Europe Cheers as Obama Ends Bush's 'War on Terror, EURACTIV.CoM, Jan. 23, 2oo8,
available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/europe-cheers-obama-ends-bush-
war-terror/article-178757.
117 Brian Beary, Obama Gets Mixed Review from EU Data Protection Supervisor,
EUROPOLITICS, Nov. 19, 2009, available at http://www.europolitics.info/external-
policies/obama-gets-mixed-review-from-eu-data-protection-supervisor-art255o51-
44.html.
118 Id.
1Vol. 5:3504
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treaty obligations and compliance with international law, these efforts
may go a long way in assuaging European concerns over privacy
matters and will pave the way for the continuance of PNR
Agreements.

